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Abstract
The present paper takes it as an indisputable fact that subjective-behavioral
thinking leads, for deeper methodological reasons, with inner necessity to
inconclusive filibustering about the agents’ economic conduct and therefore
has to be replaced by something fundamentally different. The key argument
runs as follows: (a) the subjective-behavioral approach can not, as a matter of
principle, afford a correct profit theory, (b) without a correct profit theory it
is impossible to comprehend how the monetary economy works, (c) without
this knowledge economic policy proposals are unjustifiable, (d) thinking like
an economist may be hazardous to the economy.
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It is a touchstone of accepted economics that all explanations must
run in terms of the actions and reactions of individuals. Our behavior
in judging economic research, in peer review of papers and research,
and in promotions, includes the criterion that in principle the behavior
we explain and the policies we propose are explicable in terms of
individuals, not of other social categories. (Arrow, 1994, p. 1)
This is probably the best answer to the question of why theoretical economics
has achieved comparatively little with so much effort and the most advanced
tools. Stiglitz provides more details about what it means to think like an accepted
economist.
Though different economists employ different models of the econ-
omy they all use a basic set of assumptions as a point of departure.
The economist’s basic competitive model has three components: as-
sumptions about how consumers behave, assumptions about how firms
behave, and assumptions about the markets in which these consumers
and firms interact. (Stiglitz, 1996, p. 28)
The present paper takes it as an indisputable fact that subjective-behavioral thinking
leads, for deeper methodological reasons, with inner necessity to inconclusive
filibustering about the agents’ economic conduct and therefore has to be replaced
by something fundamentally different.1 The key argument runs as follows: (a) the
subjective-behavioral approach can not, as a matter of principle, afford a correct
profit theory, (b) without a correct profit theory it is impossible to comprehend
how the monetary economy works, (c) without this knowledge economic policy
proposals are unjustifiable,2 (d) thinking like an economist may be hazardous to
the economy because it involves, as the matter stands at the moment,3 having no
proper idea of the fundamental concepts income and profit. Hence, doing accepted
economics is like doing physics without a clear idea of force and mass.
I think it is the lack of quite sharply defined concepts that the main
difficulty lies, and not in any intrinsic difference between the fields of
economics and other sciences. (von Neumann, quoted in Mirowski,
2002, p. 146 fn. 49)
1 “By having a vague theory it is possible to get either result. . . . It is usually said when this is
pointed out, ‘When you are dealing with psychological matters things can’t be defined so precisely’.
Yes, but then you cannot claim to know anything about it.” (Feynman, 1992, p. 159)
2 “We have long known that the conduct of economic policy requires the policy-maker to have a
theory of how the economy works.” (Laidler, 1993, p. xii)
3 “The currently prevailing pattern of economic theorizing exhibits the following three characteristics:
(1) a syncopated style of argument fluctuating back and forth between literary and symbolic modes of
expression, (2) naive translation, or the loose paraphrasing of formulae into sentences, and (3) loose
verbal reasoning for certain aspects of theoretical argumentation where explicit symbolic formulation
is lacking.” (Dennis, 1982, p. 698)
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The point is, that alone the objective-structural approach yields sharply defined
concepts. This is demonstrated in the following.
Section 1 provides the formal foundations. The structural axiom set is composed
of rather straightforward propositions that are not new in themselves but unique in
their consistent combination. They are applied in Section 2 to the determination of
the market clearing price in the pure consumption economy. In Section 3 financial
profit is in direct lineage derived from the axioms. This helps to explain why the
correct profit theory is, as a matter of principle, beyond the grasp of methodological
individualism. In Section 4 the formalism is consistently differentiated in order to
include the investment industry and to derive the General Complementarity which
defines the relation between retained profit, investment, and saving. Section 5
summarizes the manifest confusion about profit with a sketchy genealogy.
1 Fundamental things
. . . in economics the time has not come to speak of many things, the
time has come to speak of fundamental things. (Akerman, 1936, p.
122)
1.1 The whole economy in the axiomatic nutshell
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditure
in a period of arbitrary length. The period length is conveniently assumed to be
the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have for the beginning one world
economy, one firm, and one product. Axiomatization is about ascertaining the
minimum number of premises. Three suffice for the beginning.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income, i.e.
the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
If DN is set to zero then total income consists only of wage income.
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on the underlying production process. The 2nd axiom
should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function.
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Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P and
quantity bought X .
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment expen-
ditures, no foreign trade, and no government.
All axiomatic variables are measurable in principle. The economic meaning is rather
obvious for the set of structural axioms. What deserves mention is that total income
in (1) is the sum of wage income and distributed profit and not of wage income and
profit. Profit and distributed profit are quite different things as we shall see in a
moment.
Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) provided a precise definition of accepted eco-
nomics that boils down to three axioms. This is a happy coincidence because
it enables a one-to-one comparison. The second column in Table 1 summarizes
obsolete behavior-centered thinking, the first column summarizes the correct point
of theoretical departure.
structural axiomatic economics neoclassical economics
Y =WL+DN methodological individualism
O = RL methodological instrumentalism
C = PX methodological equilibration
Table 1
Note that the first column is perfectly transparent while the second delineates a
philosophical morass.
1.2 Definitions
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms. With (4) wage
income YW and distributed profit YD is defined:
YW ≡WL YD ≡ DN |t. (4)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical context
of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
We define the sales ratio as:
ρX ≡ XO |t. (5)
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A sales ratio ρX = 1 indicates that the quantity sold X and the quantity produced O
are equal or, in other words, that the product market is cleared.
We define the expenditure ratio as:
ρE ≡ CY |t. (6)
An expenditure ratio ρE = 1 indicates that consumption expenditure C are equal to
total income Y , in other words, that the household sector’s budget is balanced.
2 The commodity price
. . . the prevailing tendency to call propositions of pure theory “laws”
is misleading and inappropriate, . . . (Hutchison, 1960, p. 63)
2.1 Determination
The price follows as a dependent variable from the axioms (1) to (3) and the
definitions (5) and (6) as:
P =
ρE
ρX
W
R
if YD = 0 |t. (7)
From this the market clearing price follows:
P = ρE
W
R
if ρX = 1 |t . (8)
From this the supersymmetric market clearing price follows under the additional
condition of budget balancing:
P =
W
R
if ρE = 1 |t. (9)
The supersymmetric market clearing price is, under the stated conditions, equal
to unit wage costs, that is, profit per unit is zero at any level of employment. All
changes of the wage rate and the productivity affect the market clearing price. The
elementary consumption economy with full price flexibility on the product market
is reproducible for an indefinite time span at any level of wage rate, productivity
and employment under the premise that no quantitative restrictions on the material
side obtain.
The supersymmetric market clearing price is an algebraic concept. There is no such
thing as a deterministic law of demand or supply. Forces that move the economy
towards an equilibrium are absent.
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2.2 Intuitive implications
The supersymmetric market clearing price has been determined without any as-
sumptions about human behavior. What is more, there is no place for the behavioral
assumptions that are incorporated in demand and supply schedules. This would only
overdetermine the formal system. Eq. (9) fully replaces the vacuous and misleading
demand–supply–equilibrium explanation.
Eq. (9) also tells us that the commonplace quantity theory cannot be true. The
quantity of money is not a determinant of the market clearing price. For further
details about the derivation of the quantity of money from the structural axiom set
see (2011a).
Eq. (9) can be rewritten as
W
P
= R |t (10)
and now states that the real wage is equal to the productivity. This implies that the
real wage is not separately determined in the labor market. The usual determination
by means of demand and supply schedules for labor and the implicit optimization
calculus of employees and employers is therefore redundant. The commonplace
tenet that the real wage must fall in order to increase employment is inapplicable
to the economy as a whole. Under the given conditions there is neither a relation
between employment and real wage nor between employment and profit. The real
wage is determined by the axiom set and the conditions YD = 0, ρX = 1, ρE = 1.
Eq. (9) finally tells us that, if we want absolute price stability in the pure consump-
tion economy, wage rate and productivity must always move in step; failing this we
will either see inflation or deflation.
3 Profit
. . . one of the most convoluted and muddled areas in economic theory:
the theory of profit. (Mirowski, 1986, p. 234)
3.1 Definition
The business sector’s financial profit in period t is defined with (11) as the difference
between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with consumption
expenditure C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW :4
4 Under the condition of market clearing, i.e. ρX = 1. For details about changes of inventory see
(2011b, Sec. 1). Nonfinancial profit is treated at length in (2012).
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Q f i ≡C−YW |t. (11)
Because of (3) and (4) this is identical with:
Q f i ≡ PX−WL |t. (12)
With the supersymmetric market clearing price (9) inserted this gives zero profit
for the business sector as a whole for all configurations of wage rate, productivity
and employment. Note that a productivity increase has no effect on profit but only
on the market clearing price. The same holds for changes of the wage rate. The
business sector may cut wage costs or improve efficiency at libitum, profit will not
appear before the invisible hand makes ρE > 1 or YD > 0. Accepted microeconomic
thinking is obviously inapplicable to the economy as a whole.
From (11) and (1) follows:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD |t. (13)
The three equations are formally equivalent and show profit under different perspec-
tives. Eq. (13) tells us that overall profit is zero if ρE = 1 and YD = 0.
3.2 Beyond the grasp of methodological individualism
The determinants of profit look essentially different depending on the perspective.
For the individual firm price P, quantity X , wage rate W , and employment L in (12)
appear to be all important; under the broader perspective of (13) these variables play
no role at all.
The individual firm is blind to the structural relationships as given by (13). On the
firm’s level profit is therefore subjectively interpreted as a reward for innovation
or superior management skills or higher efficiency or toughness on wages or for
risk taking or capitalizing on market imperfections or as the result of monopolistic
practices. These factors play a role when it comes to the distribution of profits
between firms and these phenomena become visible when similar firms of an
industry are compared. The case is perfectly clear when there is only one firm. It is
a matter of indifference whether the firm’s management thinks that it needs profit to
cover risks or to finance growth or whether it realizes the profit maximum or not. If
the expenditure ratio is unity and distributed profit is zero, profit as defined by (13)
will invariably be zero, no matter what the agents want or plan.
From the structural axioms and definitions follows in direct lineage:
• The business sector’s revenues can only be greater than costs if, in the simplest
of all possible cases (YD = 0), consumption expenditures are greater than
wage income.
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• In order that profit comes into existence for the first time in the pure con-
sumption economy the household sector must run a deficit at least in one
period.
• Wage income is the factor remuneration of labor input L. Profit Q f i is not a
factor income. Since capital is non-existent in the pure consumption economy
profit is not functionally attributable to capital.
• Profit has no real counterpart in the form of a piece of the output cake. Profit
has a monetary counterpart.
• The existence and magnitude of financial profit does not depend on profit
maximizing behavior of the firm but solely on the expenditure ratio of the
household sector.
• The value of output is, in the general case, different from the sum of factor
incomes. This is the defining property of the monetary economy.
• Only in the limiting case YD = 0, ρX = 1 and ρE = 1 is the value of output
equal to factor income, i.e. C = YW . This is the zero profit case.
The fundamental error of value theory is to start from the premise that the value of
the output of goods and services is always equal to the sum of factor incomes. This
error can be traced back to Adam Smith (2008, p. 155).
Under the condition C = Y financial profit Q f i is according to (13) numerically
equal to distributed profit YD. The fundamental difference between the two variables
does not catch the eye in this limiting case. The equality of profit and distributed
profit is an implicit feature of equilibrium models. These have no counterpart in
reality. In the real world holds C 6= Y , hence profit and distributed profit are never
equal.
Models that are based on the familiar definition total income ≡ wages + profits are
erroneous because profit and distributed profit is not the same thing.
The fallacy of composition is, as a side-effect of methodological individualism, the
prevalent defect of accepted economic thinking.
3.3 Retained profit and saving: the Special Complementarity
Once profit has come into existence for the first time (that is: logically – a historical
account is a quite different matter) the business sector has the option to distribute or
to retain it. This in turn has an effect on profit. This effect is captured by (13) but it
is invisible in (12). Both equations, though, are formally equivalent.
Retained profit Qre is defined for the business sector as a whole as the difference
between profit and distributed profit in period t:
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Qre ≡ Q f i−YD ⇒ Qre ≡C−Y |t. (14)
Retained profit is, due to (13), equal to the difference of consumption expenditures
and total income.
The household sector’s financial saving is given as the difference of income and
consumption expenditures:
S f i ≡ Y −C |t. (15)
In combination with (14) follows:
Qre ≡−S f i |t. (16)
Financial saving and retained profit always move in opposite directions. Let us
call this the Special Complementarity. It says that the complementary notion to
saving is not investment but negative retained profit. Positive retained profit is the
complementary of dissaving.
Eq. (16) tells us that the plans of households and firms are in the general case not
compatible. If, in the pure consumption economy, the households realize their saving
plans firms cannot realize their profit plans. This poses a serious theoretical problem
if equilibrium is defined in behavioral terms as compatibility of all individual plans.
4 Micro and macro consistency
. . . saving and investment are, necessarily and by definition, equal –
which after all, is in full harmony with common sense and the common
usage of the world. (Keynes, quoted in Coates, 2007, p. 91)
. . . Keynes, too, sometimes gave the impression of not having fully
grasped the logic of his own system. (Laidler, 1999, p. 281)
We are now ready to move from the pure consumption economy to the much more
complex investment economy. Based on the differentiated formalism it is assumed
that the investment goods industry, which consists of one firm, produces OI = XI
units of an investment good, which is bought by the consumption goods industry to
be used for the production of consumption goods in future periods. The households
buy but the output of the consumption goods industry (for details see 2011c). From
(11) then follows for the financial profit of the consumption and investment goods
industry, respectively:
Q f iC ≡C−YWC
Q f iI ≡ I−YWI
|t. (17)
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Total financial profit, defined as the sum of both industries, is then given by the sum
of consumption expenditure and investment expenditure minus wage income which
is here expressed, using (1), as the difference of total income minus distributed
profit:
Q f i ≡C+ I− (Y −YD)
with YW ≡ YWC +YWI |t.
(18)
From this and the definition of financial saving (15) follows:
Q f i ≡ I−S+YD |t. (19)
Higher total financial profits on the one side demand as a corollary, i.e. as a logical
implication of the definition itself, higher investment expenditure and distributed
profits and lower saving on the other side. By finally applying the definition of
retained profit (14) the General Complementarity follows:
Qre ≡ I−S |t. (20)
If retained profit Qre is zero, that is, if profit and distributed profit happen to be
equal in (14), then, as a corollary, investment expenditure and household saving
in (20) must be equal too. Vice versa, if it happens that household saving is equal
to investment expenditure then, as a corollary, profit and distributed profit must
be equal too. In reality, though, profit and distributed profit are never equal and
correspondingly household saving and investment are not equal either. The fact
that retained profit is different from zero in the real world can be taken as an
empirical proof of the logically equivalent inequality of household saving and
business investment. That is, all I=S/I≡S-models are logically deficient. This
includes Hick’s IS-LM model. The well-known ex-ante/ex-post rationalization is
beside the point for the simple reason that a meticulous recording of all transactions
during one period arrives at the General Complementarity (20) which is the logical
terminus of the analysis (for details see 2013). As with most other errors of accepted
economics, the I=S/I≡S-tenet ultimately depends on the wrong profit theory.
5 Summary: A sketchy genealogy of manifest confusion
We have two criteria to assess a theory: material consistency and formal consistency
(Klant, 1994, p. 31). A theory must satisfy both criteria, that is to say, it can
be rejected either on empirical or on logical grounds alone. As a consequence
of the foregoing analysis the following statements have to be rejected on purely
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formal grounds. Each one sounds plausible on its own terms but is neither formally
well-grounded nor compatible with the structural axiom set.
Ricardo: . . . profits would be high or low in proportion as wages were low or high.
(1981, p. 110)
Marshall: The normal earnings of management are of course high in proportion to
the capital, and therefore the rate of profits per annum on the capital is high, when
the work of management is heavy in proportion to the capital. (2009, p. 508)
Knight: The presence of true profit, therefore, depends on an absolute uncertainty
in the estimation of the value of judgment, or on the absence of the requisite
organization for combining a sufficient number of instances to secure certainty
through consolidation. (2006, p. 285)
Schumpeter: And since the new combinations which are carried out if there is
“development” are necessarily more advantageous than the old, total receipts must
in this case be greater than total costs. (2008, p. 129)
von Mises: The ultimate source from which entrepreneurial profit and losses are
derived is the uncertainty of the future constellation of demand and supply. (2007,
p. 293)
Keynes: Thus the factor cost and the entrepreneur’s profit make up, between them,
what we shall define as the total income resulting from the employment given by
the entrepreneur. (1973, p. 23), original emphasis
Hicks: The curve IS can therefore be drawn showing the relation between Income
and interest which must be maintained in order to make saving equal to investment.
(1937, p. 153)
Samuelson: GDP, or gross domestic product, can be measured in two different
ways: (1) as the flow of final products, or (2) as the total costs or earnings of inputs
producing output. Because profit is a residual, both approaches will yield exactly
the same total GDP. (1998, p. 392)
Debreu: . . . the consumers own the resources and control the producers. Thus, the
ith consumer receives the value of his resources . . . and the shares . . . of the profit
of the 1st, . . . , jth, . . . , nth producer. . . . Consider a private ownership economy
E . When the price system is p, the jth producer tries to maximize his profit on
Y j. Suppose that yj does this; the profit pj(p) = p • yj is distributed to shareholders.
(1959, pp. 78-79)
Arrow and Hahn: Given a set of prices for all commodities, it is possible to calculate
for each activity its profit, the excess of the values of its outputs over the value of its
inputs; . . . The assumptions of perfect competition imply that . . . each firm chooses
an activity that yields it at least as much profit as any other possible. (1991, p. 53)
Kaldor: Income may be divided into two broad categories, Wages and Profits (W and
P), where the wage-category comprises not only manual labour but salaries as well,
11
and Profits the income of property owners generally, and not only of entrepreneurs;
. . . (1956, p. 95)
Kalecki: Gross profits = Gross private investment + Capitalists’ consumption. (1942,
p. 259)
Goodwin: Surplus=profit=savings=investment. (1967, p. 55)
Boland: The Walrasian prices correspond to the Marshallian long-run equilibrium
prices where every producer is making zero excess profits. Thus, since in the short-
run non-zero profit is possible, the actual short-run prices cannot always be used
for aggregation. But, from the macro perspective of Walrasian general equilibrium,
the total profits in this case cannot be other that zero (otherwise, we would need a
Santa Claus to provide the aggregated positive profit) but this does not preclude the
possibility of short-run profits and losses of individual firms canceling each other
out. (2003, p. 150), original emphasis
Minsky: The simple equation “profit equals investment” is the fundamental relation
for a macroeconomics that aims to determine the behavior through time of a cap-
italist economy with a sophisticated, complex financial structure. (2008, p. 161),
original emphasis
Wickens: Implicit measure of profits Πt =−kt+1 +(1+θ)kt . (2008, p. 82)
Keen: . . . net annual income in this simple model equals the sum of wages plus
profits. (2011, p. 366)
That much is evident from even the sketchiest synopsis: “A satisfactory theory
of profits is still elusive.” (Desai, 2008, p. 10). Thinking like an economist is,
demonstrably, a rather futile exercise.
Economists by and large believe that they are entitled to define terms as they see
fit and that it is a waste of time to quarrel over words. Confusion is redefined as
pluralism and in turn ascribed to complexity. While it is certainly a waste of time to
quarrel over words, it is indispensable to clarify the fundamental concepts and to
make sure that they are consistent. As a matter of fact, this is the most important
task, the defining act of a science, or, in J. S. Mill’s words, the opus magnum.
What are the propositions which may reasonably be received without
proof? That there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since
there cannot be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from
nothing. But to determine what these propositions are, is the opus
magnum of the more recondite mental philosophy. (Mill, 2006, p. 746),
original emphasis
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